



Session storage

State of the Art and Gaps in hydrogen storage in material systems

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
Things to be discussed

Is (safety of) hydrogen-storage material an issue?

State of the Art & Gaps at material level

State of the Art & Gaps at system level

Not discussed:
toxicology



From the previous Report (2013)

Metal hydrides exhibit high potential to meet the US DOE system targets for automotive hydrogen storage.

The hydrogen release is of moderate speed due to the fact that it is endothermal and is controlled by diffusion.

The hazards will rise, in presence of unpassivated light metals . A destruction of the storage containers might be expected generating a highly pyrophoric cloud in hydrogen.

Related knowledge gap

Investigation of accident/crash situation including hydride storage facilities.

Is solid-state storage still considered a viable solution?



For FCH JU no technologies with $TRL \geq 3$.

It is not probable that hydrides will have a market chance for on-board storage

Fundamental research on hydrides is not in general a guarantee for safer storage.



Classic storage materials now investigated for chemical compression and purification

The technology is still considered promising for stationary applications











What's going in Europe ? FCH JU projects

Project	Application	Output	Base materials
BOR4STORE	On-board storage	FC-integrated Prototype	LiBH_4
EDEN	Stationary, coupled to RES	FC-integrated Prototype tested in real condition	MgH_2
SSH2S	On-board storage	FC-integrated Prototype tested in real condition	Li-imide LiBH_4
HyPER	Aviation, Portable power	FC-integrated Prototype tested in real condition	MgH_2 hydride- hydroxides



Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS)

An example of the information contained:

	MgH ₂	LiH	H ₂ LiN	LaNi ₅
2. Hazard identification				
	 	  	 	  
2.1 Classification Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008	Substances, which in contact with water, emit flammable gases (Category 1) Skin irritation (Category 2) Eye irritation (Category 2)	Substances, which in contact with water, emit flammable gases (Category 1) Acute toxicity, Oral (Category 3) Skin corrosion (Category 1B)	Substances, which in contact with water, emit flammable gases (Category 2) Skin corrosion (Category 1B)	<u>Pyrophoric solids</u> (Category 1) Substances, which in contact with water, emit flammable gases (Category 1) Skin irritation (Category 2) Eye irritation (Category 2) Respiratory sensitization (Category 1) Skin sensitization (Category 1) Carcinogenicity (Category 2) Specific target organ toxicity - single exposure (Category 3) Specific target organ toxicity - repeated exposure (Category 1) Chronic aquatic toxicity (Category 3)

Very important in labs. Not enough for designers

UN Recommendations: Transport of Dangerous Goods

Classification

Almost all hydrogen storage materials fall in the UN-RTDG Class 4 material category which consists in ***“flammable solids; substances liable to spontaneous combustion; substances which, in contact with water, emit flammable gases”***.

Example of Testing requirements for class 4:

- Burning Rate Test (Class 4.1),
- Pyrophoricity Test (Class 4.2)
- Water-reactivity Test (Class 4.3).


Also of interest, tests for “explosives” in Class 1:

- Explosibility test
- Explosibility and auto-ignition temperature of dust cloud,
- Minimum concentration,
- Minimum ignition energy,
- Explosion characteristics
- Eruption test.




Behaviour of storage materials under accidental conditions

Example of testing




Pyrophoricity test for NaAlH_4 (0.02TiCl_3), consisting in dropping water on a certain quantity of material.




Burning rate test for $\text{LiBH}_4 + 2\text{LiNH}_2$

Reactivity of NaAlH_4 with O_2 , H_2O , and CO_2




Simultaneous Thermogravimetric
Modulated Beam Mass
Spectrometer (STMBMS)




The gas evolution rate of D_2 from samples of NaAlD_4 that have been exposed to various levels of oxygen

Reaction energies




Heat flow from neutral water hydrolysis of $2\text{LiBH}_4 \cdot \text{MgH}_2$ at 40°C and 70°C and



reaction progress as a function of time determined from the integrated calorimetric signal

Eruption test of NaAlH_4



IR thermograms from the eruption test for $\text{NaAlH}_4(0.02\text{TiCl}_3)$. Colour temperature scale is in centigrades.

Conclusions at material level

The scientific works published up to now have contributed to one or more of the following research lines:

- The qualification of the chemical reactions during the environmental exposure, for example by means of the UN tests used for the classifications of the materials in various hazard classes.
- The quantification of the chemical processes by measuring reactivity properties such as energy release, temperature and pressure values to understand the fundamentals of contamination.
- The prediction of chemical reactions and hazards for a number of accidental scenarios to extend the process predictive capability to the application scale.
- The development of heat and mass transfer models.
- The modelling of reactions and their effects by computational methods.

Behaviour of solid-state storage tanks under accidental conditions

The RCS framework: a Swiss cheese

ISO 16111: Transportable gas storage devices in reversible metal hydrides
Not good for transport: only 150 l t max 25 MPa, not for fixed fuel-storage
on-board hydrogen fuelled vehicles

Useful however as starting point for some tests:

- overpressure and fire protection (including temperature-activated pressure release device),
- shut-off valves and particulate confinement.
- actively cooled assemblies.


*An update: in 2015 the ISO
TC197 started the WG25 for
an update of IS 16111*

Additional ISO standards exists for hydrogen structural metals
interactions.

A FIRST FMEA approach (project STORTHY)


- Hydrogen permeation or leakage leading to early or late ignition or explosion, caused for example by i) Pipe break, ii) TPRD spurious venting, iii) loose joints or fittings, iv) hydrogen permeation or diffusion.
- Catastrophic failure of the hydrogen storage vessel, caused for example by
 - i) vehicular collision
 - ii) burst due to external fire and TPRD failure to vent.

- Fluid intrusion into storage vessel leading to chemical reaction with hydrogen storage material, which includes water and/or air intrusion




What if air get into the storage?

Modelling of a breach-in-tank scenario for an AlH_3 tubular tank




80% porous bed
a reaction front propagating through the
system for one hour

The conclusions suggest that this
accidental scenario does not
represent the worst case.



What if air get into the storage

Experimental emission of NaAlH_4 nano powder



Principle of the KIT experiments




Powder expulsion cloud without external source of ignition

In all investigated cases, the **reaction speed in the powder–gas mixture is slower than in the case of the deflagration of pure hydrogen**, despite the fact that the energy content of the pure H_2 experiments is lower than in the H_2 /powder mixture.


Reducing hazard by compacting

The trick here is to reduce exposure to air and its contaminants, without jeopardising the hydrogen loading and releasing kinetics



NaAlH₄ wafer after 72 h of exposure to ambient air: (A) side-view and (B) top view.
Volume variation indicating slow reaction without sudden energy release

Reducing hazard by additives



Water Drop Test for $8\text{LiH} \cdot 3\text{Mg}(\text{NH}_2)_2$

Top: pure material sample

Bottom: sample with flame retardant material

Conclusions

- Exposure of hydrogen storage **materials** to air and water causes in general first one or more material-liquid and/or material-gas reactions, followed by hydrogen release and possible hydrogen ignition.
- In the case of a de-hydrogenated material, presence of hydrogen is reduced, but the reactivity of the powder could be higher than in the fully hydrogenated case.
- In **storage tanks**, hydrogen is also present in gaseous form, so that hydrogen ignition can take place before or in parallel with material reactions, accelerating or even triggering them.
- In general, the hydrogen ignition and its consequences (detonation, deflagration) represent higher hazards than material-gas or material-liquid reactions (this however is not always true: for example in the case of desorbed material containing pure aluminium powder).

Gaps

R&D gaps

Models and experiments produced so far are considerable, but not enough to calculate quantitative risks related to full scale tanks under accidental conditions.

This is mainly because:

- ☞ Complexity of the system (gas and powder, multiple reaction paths in parallel)
- ☞ Quantitative and time-dependent reaction data scarce. Strong focus on few material systems.
- ☞ No data from real accidental conditions with the required material quantities.

In addition, end-of-life aspects should be also considered:

- ☞ Disposal guidelines missing

RCS gaps

Each project developing a prototype has to learn how and perform a safety analysis and obtain license.

- ☞ There is a need for filling the gaps and for harmonisation of solutions.